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supplies. As a result of the PVP, medical supplies are now obtained directly from 
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at DLA depots. This thesis examines the effects that these reduced inventory levels 
have had on the Navy's ability to support contingency operations. 
The author examines both the DLA depot system and the Prime Vendor 
system and includes examples of the usage of each during contingency operations. 
The primary conclusion of this thesis is that the reduced inventories caused by 
PVP do not have a negative affect on the Navy Medicine's ability to support 
contingency operations. Specific recommendations include Prime Vendors and 
Navy planners working together to determine contingency requirements and stock 
rotation as well as an overhaul of the Authorized Medical Allowance List system. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Navy Medicine has traditionally used the Defense 
Logistics Agencies (DLA) depot system to purchase consumable 
medical supplies (pharmaceutical and medical/surgical 
supplies). In order to provide this service, DLA has 
maintained a large on-hand inventory in their depot 
warehouses. The purposes of this inventory have been to 
provide supplies for Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) and 
to provide supplies for surge and sustainment of contingency 
operations. A surge is defined as the initial phase of an 
operation during which the supplies required are obtained by 
deploying units. Sustainment is the period during which 
replenishment of those initial supplies is necessitated due to 
consumption. 
In December 1991, a Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
report criticized the Department of Defense's (DoD) high level 
of medical inventories as compared to commercial practices 
(GAO, Dec 1991). The GAO study specifically recommended that 
DoD should initiate practices similar to those used by 
civilian hospital such as Just-in-Time (JIT) inventory and 
prime vendor contracting. The findings of this GAO report 
stated that through these new practices DoD could realize 
significant cost savings while maintaining high quality health 
care. 
In response to this GAO report DoD initiated the "Prime 
Vendor Program" (PVP). This program divides the nation into 
22 geographic regions. Within each region, two "Prime Vendor" 
contracts are awarded: one for pharmaceutical supplies and the 
other for medical/surgical supplies. The Prime Vendors are 
the primary source of consumable medical supplies for each DoD 
MTF within a geographic region. The first of the Prime Vendor 
contracts was the pharmaceutical contract for the National 
Capitol area awarded in January 1993. Since then all of the 
Pha» ceutical and most of the medical/surgica supply 
contracts have been awarded. The final medica surgical 
contract is scheduled to be awarded in February 1995. 
"he goal of the Prime Vendor Program was to reduce MTF-s 
overall delivery cost of brand name medical supplies  Thus 
ooal could be achieved through reductions in inventory levels 
reductions in loss due to expiration, reductions in labor and 
increased use of electronic automation to expedite order 
recessing. Inventory levels have decreased due to the Prime 
vendors' ability to deliver supplies within twenty-four hours 
of order placement,  since inventory turnover has ---*ed< 
supplies are not «on the shelf» as long, therefore, loss due 
To expiration has decreased.  Labor has been reduced because 
leSs warehouse personnel are needed to manage th.^minimal 
stocK on-hand.  Lastly, orders are sent from the 
Prime Vendor and billing data is transferred to Defense 
Personnel Support Center (DPSC) via modem so that the entire 
o^r placement, billing and payment are accomplished through 
a paperless electronic method. 
The Prime Vendor Program has been successful in reducing 
the excessive DoD medical inventory stockpiles.  Through the 
PVP, significant savings have been realized, but 
of the Prime vendors to provide the supplies needed for 
contingency operations has not been fully addressed. 
B.   PROBLEM STATEMENT „„„,.« 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the effects 
the Prime Vendor Program has had on the Navy's medica! 
readiness. Specifically, the following primary research 
guestion is proposed: «mat effect has the reduction in 
Inventory levels caused by the Pri-e Vender Progr.» had on 
Z? Medicine's ability to support the surge and sustamment 
of contingency operations? 
The following secondary questions are considered in 
addressing the primary research question: 
1. In an operational contingency deployment, can Prime 
Vendors meet the surge requirements to assure that 
Navy Medical units can deploy on time? 
2. What strategy should Navy Medicine employ to assure 
that medical readiness is maintained in the Prime 
Vendor environment of decreased medical inventories? 
3. What role should the Industrial Preparedness Program 
(IPP), Shelf-Life Extension Program and D-Day 
Significant Items List play in determining to what 
extent Prime Vendors should be relied upon to provide 
surge and sustainment supplies? 
4. How can the Authorized Medical Allowance Lists' (AMAL) 
be improved to more effectively support contingency 
operations in the environment of evolving military 
missions? 
The logistics problem involved in this thesis is a 
determination of the ability of the Prime Vendors' to meet a 
changing demand pattern. Under normal operating conditions 
(peacetime operations), the Prime Vendors have shown they are 
capable of meeting the requirements of their contracts and in 
some cases exceed those requirements (Wade, September 1994). 
This capability is the result of these Prime Vendors adapting 
to the demands of each MTF within their region. The central 
problem is can these Prime Vendors meet the change from a 
peacetime demand pattern to an operational contingency demand 
pattern (war/conflict scenario). Secondary to this problem is 
the question of safety stock. If the Prime Vendors are unable 
to meet the wartime scenario demand pattern, the difference 
between this demand and what the Prime Vendors can provide is 
the safety stock required to maintain medical readiness. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The Prime Vendor Program has been implemented for all 
Defense Department Medical activities, yet the focus of this 
thesis is on Navy medical readiness. The differences in the 
missions of the various services precludes including the 
uniqueness of each service in this study. The Army and Air 
Force Medical missions warrant a study of how this inventory 
reduction has effected their readiness. However, due to time 
constraints, this study will only analyze this problem from a 
Navy perspective. 
Also the Prime Vendor Program is a vast program which is 
in its initial phase. This fact limits this study to only the 
pharmaceutical aspects of the PVP. All of the regional 
pharmaceutical Prime Vendor contracts have been awarded, 
therefore, the data necessary for this analysis is available. 
In contrast some of the medical/surgical supply contracts have 
just been awarded in the past few months while others have yet 
to be awarded. The medical/surgical supply portion of this 
program as well as the Army and Air Force perspectives hold 
great potential for additional research. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the Department of Defense's Prime 
Vendor Program as administered by the Defense Logistics 
Agency's Defense Personnel Support Center. The results of 
this thesis will illustrate the steps necessary to assure 
medical readiness is maintained despite the reduction of on- 
hand medical inventory. 
The majority of the information contained in this thesis 
was provided by library research, comprehensive reviews of the 
literature and policies, and interviews with personnel from 
Navy Medical Logistics Command (NMLC), Defense Medical 
Standardization Board (DMSB), and the Joint Medical Logistics 
Functional Development Center (JMLFDC) all at Ft. Detrick 
Maryland as well as Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) in 
Philadelphia Pennsylvania. Information obtained from these 
sources is utilized to make recommendations on a course of 
action through which the Prime Vendor Program can best support 
contingency operations. 
E.   CONTENTS OF THESIS 
Chapter II contains a review of the Prime Vendor Program, 
an explanation of how the Prime Vendor Program works along 
with a comparison of how this system worked before 
implementation of the Prime Vendor Program. 
Chapter III is a discussion of the medical readiness 
environment in which the Prime Vendor Program is being called 
upon to operate. Included in Chapter III is the example of 
the USNS COMFORT'S (T-AH 20) use of a Prime Vendor in support 
of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. 
Chapter IV discusses the Prime Vendor's ability to meet 
the changing demand patterns caused by the surge of a 
contingency operation. Included in Chapter IV is a section 
highlighting the views and concerns of the Prime Vendors. 
Chapter V contains conclusions and recommendations. 

II.  PRIME VENDOR OVERVIEW 
Prior to pharmaceutical Prime Vendor contracts being 
awarded the Defense Personnel Support Center had to determine 
the specifications for these contracts. DPSC was also 
required to get the cooperation of the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing industry. This cooperation was necessary so 
that the selected regional Prime Vendor could distribute the 
products of the pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
A.   DISTRIBUTION AND PRICING AGREEMENTS 
Initially, agreements between DPSC-Medical and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers had to be negotiated. These 
agreements, called Distribution and Pricing Agreements 
(DAPAs), were necessary to allow Prime Vendors to distribute 
the products of these manufacturers. The DAPAs also set the 
ceiling price that Prime Vendors "could charge for these 
products. 
The Prime Vendor can only provide products for which 
DAPAs have been negotiated. Due to this fact, manufacturers 
are encouraged to have all of their commercial products listed 
in the negotiated DAPA. A DAPA is structured to allow 
flexibility so that commercial products can be added or 
deleted based on the wishes of the manufacturer and/or DPSC- 
Medical. Prices listed in the DAPAs must be certified in 
accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 
section 13.106 , which is the "price reasonableness test» 
(FAR, Apr 1985). Once the DAPAs were in place the next step 
in the process was to select the regional Prime Vendors. This 
was done through a competitive bid process in which DPSC- 
Medical was the contracting authority. 
B.   PRIME VENDOR CONTRACT 
A Prime Vendor contract is a "modified requirements 
contract" as defined by the FAR section 16.503 (FAR, Apr 
1985). This contract is "used to meet all actual purchase 
requirements for covered items at medical treatment 
facilities" (Walters, May 1993). The MTFs which are covered 
by a regional Prime Vendor are obligated to use that Prime 
Vendor to purchase any item included in a DAPA. The regional 
pharmaceutical Prime Vendor is a mandatory source of 
pharmaceutical supplies with the following exceptions: 
• If the item is available from a DoD depot warehouse at 
a lower price. 
• If the item is carried by DPSC medical electronic 
commerce program which provides direct delivery from 
the manufacturer. 
• If the item is available from a mandatory source such 
as Federal Prisoner Industries (FPI) or National 
Institute for the Blind (NIB). 
• If the Prime Vendor cannot meet the requirement within 
the 24-hour delivery period due to an item being out of 
stock or due to a manufacturer's back order. 
Each Prime Vendor must meet the service requirements as 
set forth in the contract. First, the Prime Vendor must meet 
the minimum fill rate of 95 percent of the line items ordered. 
While this is the minimum it is expected that 97 to 98 percent 
should be the typical fill rate percentage. Second, each 
order should be filled and delivered within twenty-four hours 
of ordering and delivery should be provided six days per week. 
Third, the Prime Vendor should be able to deliver to at least 
two and up to fifteen sites (MTFs). Fourth, the status as to 
whether an item is out of stock or not should be available to 
the ordering activity within two hours. It is expected that 
the status will typically be available within 20 minutes. 
This requirement allows the ordering activity the flexibility 
to obtain an item from other sources if the need arises. 
Finally, an additional requirement is included in the contract 
which states that the Prime Vendor must be able to deliver 
within six hours two emergency orders per month. (Tackitt, 
September 1992) 
C.   PRIME VENDOR PROCESS 
After the DAPAs have been negotiated and the regional 
Prime Vendor is selected, the military treatment facilities in 
that region are obligated to obtain their supplies from that 
Prime Vendor. All of the items which have a DAPA are now 
listed in a DAPA computer catalog, which lists the products 
from various manufacturers and the prices of those products. 
This catalog is an electronic link between the Prime Vendor, 
the MTFs and the DAPA holders (the manufacturers and DPSC). 
Access is provided through a Personal Computer (PC) via a 
modem hook-up. The hardware and software support are to be 
provided by the selected Prime Vendor. 
The typical Prime Vendor ordering sequence begins with 
the MTF determining what they need to order. The DAPA 
computer catalog information is used to order the requested 
items. At this point in the order process the ordering 
activity has the ability to see if the item they need is 
available and also if that item is available from different 
manufacturers at different prices. [An example of this could 
be that various companies make 325 milligram aspirin tablets 
in 1000 tablets bottles. If the MTF needed to order a 
quantity of this item they have the ability to choose the 
manufacturer who offers this item at the best price (assuming 
the quality of these products is comparable).] Once the 
appropriate items are chosen the order is then placed via 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to both the Prime Vendor and 
payment activity, DPSC. 
The order is received and processed by the Prime Vendor 
who then electronically (via EDI) sends an acknowledgement to 
the  MTF.    The  Prime  Vendor  also  sends  an  invoice 
electronically (via EDI) to the payment activity, DPSC. The 
Prime Vendor delivers the order within twenty-four hours to 
the appropriate department at the MTF which then checks the 
order for accuracy and completeness. The MTF then notifies 
DPSC that the order has been received so that DPSC can issue 
payment to the Prime Vendor via an Electronic Fund Transfer 
(EFT). This final step completes a paperless transaction in 
which DoD received required supplies and the vendor received 
the appropriate payment. 
D.   MEDICAL SUPPLY BEFORE PRIME VENDOR PROGRAM 
The supply system used by Navy Medicine prior to the 
Prime Vendor Program was characterized by high inventory 
levels and slow response times. The primary source of 
supplies was the Defense Logistics Agency's Defense Personnel 
Support Center Depots. The process differs greatly from the 
Prime Vendor method described above. The Department of the 
Navy (DON) uses a prioritized system when ordering supplies 
from these depots known as Uniform Material Movement and Issue 
Priority System (UMMIPS). The intent of this system is to 
provide rapid turnaround time for supplies which are urgently 
needed while allowing for a longer turnaround time when 
ordering routinely stocked items. 
There are three different priorities which can be 
assigned when an MTF places an order during peacetime. The 
highest priority is called a "Priority 3" order, which meant 
that the supplies should have a turnaround time of five days. 
The middle priority is called »Priority 6" with a turnaround 
time of twelve days. The lowest priority is called "Priority 
13" with a turnaround time of 31 days. In reality the time 
that it took from order to receipt by the MTF was usually 
longer than these intended turnaround times. While "Priority 
3" was usually around seven days, "Priority 6" could be as 
long as a month with "Priority 13" anywhere from 60 to 90 
days. 
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Due in part to this slow turnaround time large 
inventories were kept at the MTF or in MTF warehouses. As a 
general rule of thumb a two week to one month supply was 
stocked in the pharmacy department with an additional three to 
six months supply maintained in an MTF warehouse. This 
"safety stock" was part of the reason for the original 
criticism in the GAO report from December 1991. 
In addition to maintaining large inventories under this 
system, once an order was submitted the status of an order was 
not readily available to the department which had placed the 
order. The status of all orders was available only through 
the MTF supply department, therefore access to the status of 
a pharmacy department order was not available in the pharmacy. 
This resulted in the pharmacy waiting for an order to be 
delivered to determine which requested items had been supplied 
by the depot. The next step in the process was to then find 
an alternative source for the items which had not been 
supplied. 
The secondary source of supplies was to purchase the 
required supplies from a commercial source, this process is 
frequently referred to as an open purchase. This alternative 
source could be either a wholesaler or directly from the 
manufacturer. The open purchase procurement was usually used 
in two circumstances. The first, as mentioned above, was if 
the item was back ordered from the depot. The second reason 
was if the depot did not routinely stock the item which the 
MTF needed. The procedure required to get this procurement 
approved was complicated involving many layers of paperwork 
and screening to assure that the government paid a fair price 
in accordance with the FAR. 
The items which are available through the DLA depot 
system are listed on the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). The 
price of these items had been negotiated through the 
competitive bid process so that the government pays the best 
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price available.   While these prices were significantly 
cheaper than open purchase, DLA added a surcharge to each 
order. The surcharge, which was adjusted each year, typically 
was about 20% of the total purchase order. The purpose of the 
surcharge was to cover DLA's cost of providing this service. 
Prior to the implementation of the Prime Vendor Program 
many problems existed in the medical supply system used by 
Navy Medicine.   Primarily, the problem was obtaining the 
necessary supplies in a timely manner at a reasonable price. 
While the intent of the Prime Vendor Program was not to 
correct all the problems inherent to this system, it has begun 
to improve the process. 
E.   BENEFITS OP THE PRIME VENDOR PROGRÄM 
The benefits derived from the implementation of the Prime 
Vendor Program have addressed many of the problems highlighted 
in the previous section. 
l.  Turnaround Time 
The most apparent benefit has been the reduction in 
turnaround time when an MTF places an order. Under the depot 
system, the window for receiving an order could vary from five 
days to three months. The Prime Vendor contracts requires a 
twenty-four hour turnaround for routine items with the 
potential of a six hour turnaround for emergencies. As a 
result of this decreased turnaround time a realistic Just-in- 
Time inventory system is now feasible at DoD MTFs. 
2.  Reduction in Waste 
In using this JIT system MTFs are able to realize savings 
for a variety of reasons. Since large inventories are no 
longer required, the problem of waste due to expiration is 
greatly reduced. The practice of keeping a three or six 
months supply of a medication in the pharmacy and/or MTF 
warehouse was commonplace. If for some clinical reason the 
medical staff changed their prescribing practice so that a 
medication was no longer used at the same rate,  that 
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medication would eventually expire and have to be destroyed. 
With the Prime Vendor's twenty-four hour turnaround these 
large inventories are not required. While there will still be 
some expiration of supplies, the quantity of expired medical 
supplies has decreased, both because the quantity of medical 
supplies on-hand has decreased and the turnover of supplies 
has increased. 
3. Inventory Savings 
Another common practice was that as supplies from the MTF 
warehouses were issued to the MTF, they were replenished 
through the depot system. Since this warehouse backup is 
unnecessary in the JIT environment of Prime Vendor, a one time 
inventory saving is realized when the MTFs do not replace the 
depleted stock. The results of a study, completed by Vector 
Research, Incorporated (VRI) and Electronic Data Systems 
Corporation (EDS), calculates these one time savings of $9.9 
million for the fourteen test sites observed. This study 
through regression analysis also extrapolated these savings 
for all DoD Continental United States (CONUS) MTFs. The 
result of this extrapolation is an estimated savings of $23.9 
million for the other 97 CONUS MTFs. Using a 95% confidence 
level this estimate could range from $17.3 million to $3 0.7 
million. (Prime Vendor Evaluation, June 1994) 
4. Cost of Prime Vendor Contract 
In financial terms, the cost of the pharmaceutical Prime 
Vendor contract can go as high as 1.5% of the sales for a 
regional Prime Vendor (Tackitt, October 1992). This charge is 
significantly less than the approximately 20% surcharge which 
DLA was charging for depot items. Furthermore, another 
surcharge of 7% from the MTF warehouse charged to the pharmacy 
department for stocking medications is eliminated when using 
the Prime Vendor instead of the MTF warehouse. The low charge 
and the negotiated DAPAs combine to make the Prime Vendor 
Program  a  more  cost  effective  method  of  procuring 
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pharmaceutical supplies for those item available through Prime 
Vendors. 
5. Labor Reductions 
Money is also saved through reductions in required labor. 
Since less inventory is maintained in MTF warehouses less 
personnel are required to staff the warehouses. Also, 
clerical personnel can be reduced because bills are paid 
centrally by DPSC and the workload from open purchases orders 
has decreased. 
6. Customer Support 
The customer support portion of the Prime Vendor Program 
objective is accomplished by increasing the services and 
service levels to MTFs. The specifications in the Prime 
Vendor contracts are all improvements in customer support over 
the depot system. The 95% minimum fill rate is an improvement 
over the goal of 85% fill rate for depot orders especially 
considering that the 85% goal was often not achieved. The 
twenty-four hour turnaround time, as discussed previously, is 
vastly superior to even the highest peacetime priority of 
UMMIPS. Emergency deliveries and order status were not 
readily available through the depot system. 
The goal of the Prime Vendor Program was to reduce the 
costs of medical supplies while improving customer support. 
Even though the program is still in the initial phases it is 
well on the way to fulfilling that goal. Customer service has 
definitely improved and "costs are between 15 and 16 percent 
less than costs of the same supplies bought in bulk and 
distributed from government warehouses" (Bird, 1993). With 
this initial success the question now turns to how this 
program impacts other aspects of the mission of Navy Medicine. 
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F.   PREVIEW OP NEXT CHAPTER 
The next chapter discusses the medical readiness issues 
which are pertinent to contingency operations. The context 
for these contingency operations is the two nearly 
simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) outlined in the 
Bottom-Up Review (Bottom-Up Review, September 1993) . The 
chapter begins with a definition of medical readiness in order 
to provide the reader with the necessary framework for the 
rest of the chapter. With that framework established, the 
next step is an explanation of the echelons of medical care in 
a conflict. The rest of the chapter explains and discusses 
contingency operations and how the Prime Vendor process can be 




III.  MEDICAL READINESS ISSUES 
The Department of Defense's definition of medical 
readiness is that 
Medical Readiness encompasses the ability to 
mobilize, deploy and sustain field medical services 
and support for any operation requiring military 
services; to maintain and project the continuum of 
healthcare resources required to provide for the 
health of the force; and to operate in conjunction 
with beneficiary healthcare. (MRSP-2001, August 
1994) 
The  initial  portion  of  this  definition  (mobilization, 
deployment and sustainment) is where this thesis is focused. 
The remainder of this definition (day-to-day military medical 
practice) is the environment where the Prime Vendor Program is 
operating on a routine basis. 
A.   NAVY WARTIME MEDICAL CARE STRUCTURE 
During a conflict, the Navy's medical assets for combat 
casualty care are organized into levels or echelons. These 
levels flow from the battlesite within the theater of 
operations back to the continental United States (CONUS). The 
theater of operations is divided into two zones, the Combat 
Zone and the Communications Zone. 
The Combat Zone is defined as the area which is required 
to conduct combat operations; this includes all sea, land and 
airspace within that area. Echelons I, II and III fall within 
the Combat Zone. 
The Communications Zone is defined as the area behind the 
Combat Zone which is required to support combat operations. 
Echelon IV is in the Communications Zone while Echelon V, the 
final level, is in CONUS. 
The echelon system is characterized by decreasing 
mobility with increasing capabilities as patients flow from 
Echelon I through Echelon V. 
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1. Echelon I 
Echelon I is where initial emergency care is administered 
and patients are prepared for MEDical EVACuation (MEDEVAC). 
This initial care is provided by a Navy Hospital Corpsman 
assigned to a Marine Corps unit or to a ship's medical 
department. Echelon I also includes Marine Corps Battalion 
Aid Stations (BAS) and Shipboard Medical Aid Stations (MAS), 
which is the patient's initial contact with a physician. The 
BAS or MAS is located close to the "front line" but in a 
"safer" area. This allows a physician to determine the 
appropriate care for these patients and whether or not MEDEVAC 
is required. Echelon I is the most mobile component of the 
echelon system. 
2. Echelon II 
Echelon II is where advanced emergency care including 
resuscitation and emergency surgery can be performed by 
medical teams consisting of surgeons, nurses and medical 
technicians. Also further assessment for MEDEVAC occurs at 
Echelon II. In the Marine Corps environment, Echelon II 
consists of Collecting and Clearing Companies and Surgical 
Support Companies. In a shipboard environment, these tasks 
are coordinated by a shipboard surgeon. The final Echelon II 
activity is Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ships (CRTS), 
which is the secondary role of amphibious ships that have 
deployed their complement of troops ashore. Echelon II assets 
are less mobile but more capable than Echelon I. 
3. Echelon III 
Echelon III consist primarily of two valuable medical 
assets, Hospital Ships (T-AH) and Combat Zone Fleet Hospitals. 
Hospital Ships are 1,000 bed afloat surgical hospitals. 
Currently, there are two T-AH's in the U.S. Navy inventory, 
USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) with a homeport in Oakland, California, 
and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) with a homeport in Baltimore, 
Maryland. Combat Zone Fleet Hospitals are prepositioned 
around the world in order to be readily deployable.  These 
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hospitals are modular units which can be assembled in a 
minimal amount of time, usually in close proximity to Marine 
Corps units ashore. The Combat Zone Fleet Hospitals are 
configured in 2 sizes, a 250 bed and a 500 bed hospital. Both 
of these facilities can perform complicated surgical 
procedures as well as provide acute medical care. These assets 
in Echelon III provide highly skilled specialty definitive 
care in order to return their patients to full duty as quickly 
as possible. 
4. Echelon IV 
Echelon IV is comprised of outside the continental United 
States (OCONUS) MTF's and a Communications Zone Fleet 
Hospital. These facilities are capable of definitive 
subspecialty rehabilitative care in order to return patients 
to duty or prepare them for further MEDEVAC to CONUS MTF's. 
5. Echelon V 
The final level of care consists of CONUS MTF's as well 
as Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals and civilian 
hospitals. These facilities are used when patients require 
extensive rehabilatory treatment. 
Each of these echelons can provide capabilities equal to 
the preceding level, plus additional capabilities, for 
incrementally progressive care. In general, the more 
sophisticated the medical unit, the less mobile that unit will 
be. The goal of this echelon system is to treat combat 
casualties at the lowest echelon possible and return them to 
duty within a predetermined time frame. If this is not 
possible patients are MEDEVACed to a higher echelon. (GAO, 
July 1993) 
B.   AUTHORIZED MEDICAL ALLOWANCE LIST (AMAL) 
A medical requirements list is established for each Navy 
or Marine Corps unit which may deploy during either a 
contingency operation or normal (day-to-day) operations. 
These units encompass various Navy and Marine Corps assets 
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such as Marine Medical Logistics Companies, combatant ships, 
Fleet Hospitals and Hospital Ships, to name a few. These 
lists, called Authorized Medical Allowance Lists (AMAL), are 
the authorized allowance of medical equipment and consumable 
supplies which are required to accomplish the medical mission 
of the unit. An AMAL is determined based on the mission and 
capacity of the medical assets in the unit. For example, an 
AMAL for the Hospital Ships is a complete list of the 
medications needed to support 1000 casualties for 3 0 days. 
This list is based on a combat casualty care mission which is 
trauma/surgery intensive. 
The process by which these AMALs are produced involves 
the cooperation of various communities within the Navy Medical 
Department. In order to decide which items will be included 
in an AMAL an ad-hoc committee is convened. This committee 
includes experts from the various physician communities 
(surgery, orthopedics, etc.), nursing specialties (intensive 
care, general nursing, etc.), ancillary services (pharmacy, 
laboratory, etc.) and administrative communities 
(supply/logistics, financial management, etc.). The members 
of this committee work together to produce a list which 
balances clinical requirements with the monetary and 
logistical constraints of the mission. 
An AMAL ad-hoc committee is reconvened every two years to 
review the contents of the AMALs. This process is undertaken 
to assure that the AMALs are updated to meet the ever changing 
practice of medicine. Between reviews, changes can be made to 
an AMAL by completing and submitting an AMAL change request 
form (ACR). The goal of this review is that the standard of 
care practiced by deployed units (Hospital Ships, Fleet 
Hospitals, etc.) should not be dramatically different than 
that practiced at CONUS MTFs. 
20 
C.   AMAL FLEXIBILITY 
While the AMAL concept is a useful planning tool there is 
some criticism that it is an inflexible, outdated system 
(Brouker, October 1994). The concept for AMALs was based on 
preparing to fight the Cold War. The AMAL was designed to 
support a large scale war against Soviet forces. The reality 
of the post-Cold War military environment requires the 
flexibility to engage in diverse operations. Not all of these 
operations are wartime or combat situations in the traditional 
sense. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has 
been called on for humanitarian relief as well as for 
peacekeeping operations in various places around the world. 
The AMALs currently employed by Navy Medicine are designed 
primarily for a combat casualty care mission. Specifically, 
these AMALs are geared toward a trauma/surgery patient 
population. Humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, by 
their nature, are not as trauma/surgery intensive as combat 
operations. The medical focus for peacekeeping operations is 
essentially a primary care mission (sick call, acute care 
illnesses, etc.) with a lesser emphasis on trauma/casualty 
care. In humanitarian relief operations, the problems involve 
basic health problems (disease, malnutrition, etc.) as opposed 
to the casualties of combat. 
In some operations, the focus can change from a combat 
operation to a peacekeeping or humanitarian mission quite 
rapidly. Operation Uphold Democracy is a vivid illustration 
of this type of evolving mission. While U.S. forces were 
poised to invade Haiti in order to restore the democratically 
elected government, a transfer of power was negotiated so that 
a hostile invasion was no longer required. Once the U.S. 
troops came ashore in Haiti the invasion force was transformed 
into a peacekeeping force. In this situation, the 
trauma/surgery intensive AMAL used by the USNS COMFORT lacked 
the types of supplies and medications as needed for this newly 
defined mission. 
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Also, U.S. forces operate around the globe in regions 
involving differing weather conditions and geographic 
characteristics. The "one AMAL" concept utilizes the same 
AMAL for all contingency operations. In other words, whether 
a medical unit is deployed for a contingency operation to a 
desert plain, a tropical island or a wintery mountainous 
region, the same AMAL is used for that unit. While similar 
combat casualties may occur in each of these scenarios, the 
Disease and Non-Battle Injuries  (DNBI)  would be vastly 
different. 
As explained in the next section, the potential MRCs 
described in the Department of Defense's Bottom-Up Review 
exemplify these differences. One possible MRC is a conflict 
against either Iran or Iraq in the Persian gulf region (a 
desert environment). While the other MRC on the Korean 
peninsula exhibits the seasonal ranges from oppressive hot 
summers to bone chilling cold winters. 
Another criticism of the AMAL system is that an AMAL is 
outdated by the time it is published. The time lag between 
submission and approval of an ACR cause the AMAL to be a less 
than state-of-the-art requirements list. This type of problem 
is the result of the rapidly changing environment of health 
care practice, especially with regard to the development of 
new medications and new uses for existing medications. 
Planning for a conflict involves anticipating many 
variables. These variables include the mission type 
(peacekeeping, humanitarian, armed conflict, etc.), geographic 
location (desert, tropical, etc.) and the potential mission 
change (invasion to peacekeeping or humanitarian) of any 
contingency operation. The "one AMAL" concept restricts the 
ability of medical planners to anticipate these variables. 
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D.   CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
On September 1, 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
released "THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW: Forces For A New Era." One of 
the purposes of this report was to reexamine the United States 
defense strategy in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold 
War, military planning was focused on fighting Soviet Union 
forces around the globe. With the fall of the Soviet empire 
in the late 1980's this focus has shifted to protecting U.S. 
interests around the world and defeating regional powers which 
threaten these interests. The stated goal of the Bottom-Up 
Review is that U.S. military forces be able to win two nearly 
simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRC). An MRC is 
assumed to be similar in size to Operation Desert Shield/Storm 
(ODS). (Bottom-Up Review, September 1993) 
The primary mission of the Navy Medical Department is to 
support Fleet operations, that is to provide the necessary 
medical support for both day-to-day operational missions and 
contingency operations. Since ODS, these contingency 
operations have included Operation Provide Comfort in Northern 
Iraqi (Kurdish Refugees), Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, 
Operation Provide Promise (humanitarian relief efforts in 
Bosnia), Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti as well as 
humanitarian relief efforts for Cuban and Haitian refugees at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Due to a decrease in medical 
inventories held in the DLA depot system, Navy Medicine must 
now rely on the Prime Vendor Program to procure the medical 
supplies required for these contingency operations. 
In the broad picture of the echelon system, it is planned 
that Echelons I and II activities will eventually transition 
into prime vendor contracting for medical supplies. Currently, 
the details of these plans have not been finalized. Echelons 
IV and V (CONUS and OCONUS MTF's) are currently functioning 
within the PVP. The current supply system of these facilities 
would have little or minimal changes during a contingency 
operation.  Echelon III assets, Hospital Ships (T-AH) and 
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Fleet Hospital units, are either on-line with a Prime Vendor 
or soon will be on-line. For example, the USNS COMFORT (T-AH 
20) utilized her Prime Vendor when activated for Operation 
Uphold Democracy off the coast of Haiti (June-October 1994). 
E.   OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM (ODS) 
1.  Purpose 
In response to the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
the U.S. military initiated its largest operation since the 
Vietnam War era. The goals of this operation (Operation 
Desert Shield/Storm) was, in accordance with United Nations 
resolutions, to expel Iraq from Kuwait. In cooperation with 
more than thirty allied nations the U.S. deployed Army, Marine 
Corps and Air Force units into Saudi Arabia as well as Navy 
ships to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Red Sea. This 
positioning provided defenses against an Iraqi invasion into 
Saudi Arabia as well as a jump off point for the allied attack 
against Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq. 
2.  Medical Support Mission 
In support of this operation, the Navy deployed nearly 
12,000 medical personnel. Almost 8000 of these personnel were 
assigned to Echelons II and III units including the two 
Hospital Ships (USNS MERCY and USNS COMFORT), three Combat 
Zone Fleet Hospitals, three Marine Corps medical battalions 
and seven Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ships (CRTS) (GAO, 
July 1993). 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm occurred prior to DoD's 
initiation of the Prime Vendor Program. The medical supply 
system used during ODS was the same cumbersome system 
routinely used by CONUS MTFs. Medical supplies were obtained 
from the inventories maintained through the DLA depot system. 
The UMMIPS system changed to its wartime priorities to lessen 
turnaround time yet improvements were not observed. The 
problem was a result of medical supply orders competing with 
supply orders from combat units as well as other support units 
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in the UMMIPS system. These orders include items necessary to 
sustain units in the field such as fuel, ammunition, spare 
parts, food, etc. 
3. Military Results 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm was a resounding military 
success. The U.S. and coalition forces were successful in 
expelling Iraq from Kuwait and restoring the legitimate 
Kuwaiti government to power. The alliance maintained control 
of both airspace and sea lanes allowing the ground forces to 
rapidly defeat Iraqi forces in both southern Iraq and Kuwait. 
The ground portion of the war was completed in approximately 
100 hours. Also, casualties were amazingly low for U.S. 
forces who were involved in the vast majority of the fighting. 
4. Problems Encountered By Medical Support 
However, the medical support mission was not as 
successful as the overall campaign. Problems existed with the 
supply of medical consumables, specifically intravenous 
fluids, pharmaceuticals and other dated sterile items. Many 
in theater units reported that these items had arrived either 
expired, near expiration, or did not arrive at all. According 
to a July 1993 GAO report, Navy supply officials stated that 
these supplies had been "allowed to expire to avoid the 
expense of continually replacing them during peacetime." The 
intention was to deliver in-date items to the units at their 
deployment sites in the event of an operation like ODS. This 
problem was compounded by the fact that personnel from these 
units were unaware of these plans, therefore high priority 
requisitions were issued to replace the expired stock further 
burdening the logistics system. (GAO, July 1993) 
Another aspect of these problems was the lack of 
confidence in the supply system exhibited by many of the 
clinicians (physicians, nurses, etc.) deployed with these 
medical units. These feeling were due, in part, to past 
experiences at CONUS MTFs, the problem of expired items 
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explained above, and antiquated equipment/supplies issued with 
AMALs. As a result, some clinicians made personal requests to 
CONUS MTFs and stateside private practices to send supplies 
directly to them, bypassing the official supply system. (This 
practice was initiated when deployed personnel realized they 
were receiving personal mail/packages from home via express 
carriers (Federal Express, UPS, etc.) faster than 
requisitioned supplies were being delivered to their unit.) 
(Geiger, November 1994) 
In an attempt to streamline in-theater resupply the Army 
was designated the Single Item Manager (SIM) for medical 
supplies in November 1990. The purpose of the SIM was to 
manage medical resupply for all the military services. While 
the SIM concept was sound, the operations proved otherwise for 
Navy units. The Navy supply system was incompatible with the 
Army system used by SIM. This fact led to an increase in both 
order and shipping times. Also, due to the operational 
uniqueness of the Hospital Ships many of the items they 
required were unavailable through the Army supply system. 
Inconsistency was another weakness involved in the 
medical supply system. Orders varied widely with regard to 
percentage of order filled, turnaround time and accuracy. As 
an example of this, both Hospital Ships initiated similar 
orders upon receiving their activation orders. While the USNS 
COMFORT received 85% of her order in ten days, the fill rate 
for the USNS MERCY was 28% in the same time period. (Howell, 
October 1994) 
5.  Other Medical Factors 
Fortunately, there were other factors which lessened the 
impact these weaknesses had on the overall medical mission 
during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The three most 
important factors were: length of time before hostilities 
commenced, low casualty rates and the resourcefulness of 
medical personnel in-theater.  Without the combination of 
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these factors, medical units may not have been able to fulfill 
their missions. 
a. Timelag Before Hostilities 
The time lag from Iraqi invasion until the 
initiation of the allied air attack on Baghdad and fortified 
Iraqi defensive positions was approximately six months. Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The allied air campaign began 
on January 15, 1991 with the ground attack following in 
February 1991. This six to seven month period before the 
initiation of combat allowed medical units time to work out 
many medical supply deficiencies. 
b. Low Casualty Rate 
Prior to the conflict the anticipated casualty rates 
were estimated as 10,000 Americans Killed In Action (KIA) and 
20,000 Wounded In Action (WIA). Fortunately, the actual 
KIA/WIA figures were much lower with 124 Americans KIA and 
1500 WIA. 
c. Medical Personnel 
While the medical supply system had some 
deficiencies, the in-theater medical personnel overcame many 
of these problems. In some cases supplies were obtained 
through other than normal channels such as via express 
carriers as noted above. Also, there was bartering and 
"borrowing" between medical units (including OCONUS MTFs in 
Europe) to assure that as many units as possible were able to 
fulfill their missions. As a result of this "resourcefulness" 
most, if not all, medical units in-theater were ready and able 
to receive and treat casualties once hostilities commenced. 
Such personal initiative helped prevent a failure of the 
medical support mission for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. 
While these efforts were laudatory they cannot be relied upon 
in planning for future conflicts. In the future, it is 
unlikely that the number of casualties will be as small as in 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm or that a six month period would 
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be available to build up the required supplies. Instead of 
relying on these unpredictable factors, improvements in the 
medical material supply system are required. 
F.   OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (OUD) 
The first use of the prime vendor concept for a 
contingency operation occurred during Operation Uphold 
Democracy in 1994. OUD was the U.S. mission to restore to 
power the democratically elected government of Haiti, which 
had been removed by a Haitian military coup in 1991. The 
plans of this mission called for a U.S. invasion of Haiti in 
order to defeat the Haitian military and eventually remove the 
ruling military leadership. Once these tasks were 
accomplished the exiled government returned to Haiti to assume 
power. 
The use of a Prime Vendor in this mission occurred when 
the USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) was activated to support OUD. The 
mission of the COMFORT was to serve as the primary casualty 
receiving ship for the planned invasion. Upon activation in 
May 1994, the COMFORT had not been included in any of the 
Prime Vendor contracts which had already been awarded. 
Through the hard work of the Naval Medical Logistics Command 
and Defense Personnel Support Center, the Comfort was attached 
to the Tidewater (VA) region Prime Vendor contract before she 
deployed. If the COMFORT'S initial order had been placed as 
an open purchase it would have cost $33,860. The same order 
from the same wholesaler actually cost $17,607 when placed one 
day later as part of the Tidewater Prime Vendor contract. By 
attaching the COMFORT to this Prime Vendor a 52% savings was 
realized on the purchase price of identical items. (Wade, 
September 1994) 
The COMFORT was on-station from June 1994 until early 
October 1994. During this deployment, the COMFORT placed two 
additional orders through the Prime Vendor for medical 
supplies. A total of 250 different line-items were requested 
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in these orders. As a result of using a Prime Vendor, the 
COMFORT was able to obtain a better fill rate than through the 
DLA depot system as well as procure these medical supplies 
faster and cheaper. The fill rate for supplies ordered 
through the Prime Vendor for the COMFORT during OUD was 92%. 
Supplies, on average, were delivered in three days by the 
Prime Vendor as opposed to the typical delays experienced 
prior to PVP. Also, the savings for the supplies obtained 
through the Prime Vendor was 25% ($73,886 DAPA pricing vice 
$99,613 FSS cost). (OUD Brief, November 1994) 
The planned invasion was averted when Haitian military 
leaders agreed to step down and allow the return of Jean- 
Bertrand Aristides' democratically elected government. U.S. 
forces entered Haiti unopposed to facilitate a peaceful 
transfer of power. Fortunately, as in ODS the expected 
casualties did not occur and the trauma/surgical services of 
the COMFORT were not needed. 
In comparing the supply systems used to procure medical 
supplies during Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation 
Uphold Democracy, the prime vendor concept exhibits clear 
advantages over the depot system. Turnaround time is 
drastically reduced while costs have also been reduced. Due 
to the high fill rate and short turnaround time, the 
probability of having an item on-hand has increased. Also, 
waste due to expiration is virtually eliminated since 
inventories do not have to be maintained prior to deployment. 
While Operation Uphold Democracy is an example of the 
successful use of prime vendor contracting to support 
contingency operations, it also illustrates the problems 
associated with the "one AMAL" concept. Due to the negotiated 
settlement, the mission had changed from a forced-entry 
amphibious invasion to a peacekeeping/humanitarian operation. 
The medical supplies aboard the USNS COMFORT were designed 
around a trauma/surgery mission. A peacekeeping-humanitarian 
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mission would most likely have a different type of patient 
population characterized by acute care problems and infectious 
diseases which are not planned for in a trauma/surgical AMAL. 
G.   PREVIEW OF NEXT CHAPTER 
The military and economic advantages of the Prime Vendor 
Program have been demonstrated, however when supplies come 
from a non-military channel concern exists about that source's 
ability to respond to military needs in a conflict. Chapter 
IV examines the ability of the Prime Vendors to meet the 
changing demand pattern of a contingency operation. Also 
discussed in Chapter IV are other tools which the Department 
of Defense uses to assure readiness is maintained including 
the Industrial Preparedness Program, Shelf-Life Extension 
Program and the D-Day Significant Items List. Chapter IV 
delineates the Prime Vendor Program's strategy and tactics 
needed to maintain medical readiness to support contingency 
operations. 
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IV.  PRIME VENDOR FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
Prior to DoD's Prime Vendor Program, medical readiness 
was an outgrowth of medical inventories maintained in the DLA 
depots. Navy medical units were able to support contingency 
operations by obtaining the appropriate medical supplies 
through the depot system. Because of the Prime Vendor 
Program, the ability of the Navy Medical Department to support 
these operations is now dependent on the Prime Vendors' 
ability to provide the necessary supplies. 
A.   PRIME VENDORS ABILITY TO MEET DEMAND 
In all twenty-two CONUS geographic regions, the 
pharmaceutical Prime Vendor contracts have been on-line for a 
least six months. With each of these contracts, there has 
been a "learning curve" process. This learning curve takes 
place during the initial phase-up of these contracts usually 
in the first month or two. During this time, the Prime 
Vendors learn the medication demand patterns for each MTF 
within the region. By combining the demands of each MTF in 
the region, the Prime Vendor can determine a demand pattern 
for each medication. With this information, Prime Vendors can 
forecast the quantity of a medication they should plan to 
provide in the future. Since, Prime Vendors operate Just-in- 
Time inventory systems, the accuracy of these forecasts is 
vital to the Prime Vendor. Accurate forecasts enable the 
Prime Vendors to meet customer demands without tieing up 
capital in inventory. 
Each pharmaceutical Prime Vendor contract requires a 95% 
minimum fill rate. However, some of the regional Prime 
Vendors have been unable to meet this requirement during the 
first month of their contract. After demand patterns have 
been established in the first month, each Prime Vendor has 
been able to meet and/or exceed a 95% fill rate. 
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The luxury of being able to learn and adapt to a demand 
pattern is not available during contingency operations. In a 
contingency operation, deploying units cannot wait until a 
Prime Vendor determines the operation's demands and is able to 
fulfill those requirements. Many units deploy during the 
initial five to ten days of an operation. During this time 
frame, the Prime Vendors must respond to meet the operational 
surge. If the Prime Vendors do not know the requirements for 
an operation, the potential of meeting the requirements is at 
best a hit or miss proposition. 
B.   INFORM PRIME VENDORS OP REQUIREMENTS 
Since Prime Vendors operate on a Just-in-Time philosophy, 
similar to Navy MTFs, the probability is low that they will 
have the quantity of supplies required for an MRC. The Prime 
Vendors distribute supplies from pharmaceutical manufactures 
to MTFs as well as to various civilian institutions 
(hospitals, pharmacies, etc.). In order to maintain 
profitability, Prime Vendors hold minimal amounts of excess 
inventory above their forecast demands. Such small Prime 
Vendor safety stocks cannot be expected to meet the demands of 
an unanticipated contingency operation. 
In the past this situation was not a concern because of 
the large inventory of medical supplies held in DLA depots. 
Now that the problem has arisen, a solution is required so 
deploying medical units can procure required medical supplies. 
By working with the Prime Vendors, this problem can be 
resolved. 
The first step in the solution would be to inform the 
Prime Vendors of the medical material requirements for a 
contingency deployment. This information should be specific 
in terms of both line-items and quantities. While the line- 
items will be generally similar to peacetime MTF demands, the 
quantities will be significantly larger. The reasons for this 
difference are twofold. First, deploying units will order 30 
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to 60 day supply quantities. An MTF normally orders a week's 
supply or less since the MTF can reorder six days a week. The 
second reason is MTFs order based on a uniform expected 
patient load while a deploying unit's order is in anticipation 
of mass casualties. This situation will require Prime Vendors 
to maintain more "safety stock" to support contingency 
operations. In order for the Prime Vendors to prepare for 
deployment requirements, they must know what will be expected 
of them. 
C.   PRIME VENDOR STOCK ROTATION 
Rotating stock is a common practice throughout the 
military as well as in various civilian businesses. In a 
situation in which dated materials are used, this procedure is 
necessary to assure materials are not wasted. By using a 
first-in, first-out stock rotation, the pharmaceuticals with 
the shortest expiration date are used first. Many of the 
pharmaceutical supplies required for contingency operations 
are the same supplies used during peacetime by CONUS MTFs. 
Therefore, it would be advantageous to both DoD and the Prime 
Vendors to enter into a contractual agreement through which 
Prime Vendors can rotate contingency supplies through normal 
peacetime MTF usage. Precedence for this type of contracting 
has already been established between DoD and individual 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
An example of this type of contracting is an agreement 
between DoD and Marion Merrell Dow pharmaceutical company 
(MMD). MMD manufactures Silvadene topical cream, which is 
used for the treatment of moderate to severe burns. Since 
various types of burns frequently occur during combat, a large 
quantity is required by the military during wartime. While 
DoD MTFs use Silvadene cream in day-to-day operations, the 
large quantity needed for a war scenario would expire before 
being used in normal peacetime operations. The agreement 
calls for MMD to maintain a quantity sufficient for a war 
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scenario. This stock is never depleted; as it is purchased by 
customers, MMD replaces what has been purchased with newly 
manufactured batches of Silvadene cream. This agreement is 
advantageous to both DoD, which assures an available supply of 
a required medication, and MMD, who is able to meet their 
customer demands and still provide this service to DoD. 
Similar contractual agreements between DoD and Prime Vendors 
can provide similarly advantageous outcomes. 
D.  ADDITIONAL DOD PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
The Prime Vendor Program is one of many tools which 
military medical planners use in support of contingency 
operations. The other tools, if used in cooperation with the 
Prime Vendor Program, can enable the Navy Medical Department 
to more readily support contingency operations. 
l.  Day Significant Items List 
The D-Day Significant Items List, or D-Day List, is an 
"identification of the medical items that are essential for 
the wartime medical mission of the military services" (D-Day 
List, August 1994) . While this list does not include 
quantities required for contingency operations, it does 
include a list of medications which satisfy AMAL requirements. 
The D-Day list is useful to the Prime Vendors because it 
identifies those items which will be required during 
contingency operations. 
Another function of the D-Day list is that it provides 
identification of "military unique" items, i.e., items which 
are used specifically in military medical practice because of 
the dosage form, package size or delivery system. An example 
of a military unique item is an atropine auto-injector which 
is self-administered by troops who are exposed to certain 
chemical or biological agents. The medication, atropine, is 
not a military unique item but in combination with this 
delivery system, this item is considered military unique. The 
delivery system allows a victim of a chemical or biological 
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attack to self-administer this medication by striking the 
cylinder, which contains the medication, on his or her thigh. 
This causes a needle to spring from the cylinder and inject 
the dosage of atropine automatically into the victim. 
Military unique items are items which are not normally used in 
routine medical practice. Due to this fact, it would be 
difficult for Prime Vendors to rotate these items through 
normal peacetime usage. 
While inventories previously maintained in DLA depot 
warehouses are decreasing, the depot system is not being 
eliminated completely. Prior to the Prime Vendor Program, the 
depots maintained approximately 2600 different pharmaceutical 
line-items. It is expected that eventually the number of 
different line-items will be reduced to approximately 200. 
The process of reducing these line-items is currently in 
progress with more items being eliminated as inventories are 
depleted. 
Prime Vendors will be unable to rotate the stock of 
military unique items since these items are usually only used 
during wartime scenarios. Therefore, military unique items 
should be maintained as part of the DLA depot system while 
Prime Vendors can be utilized to provide materials for 
contingency operation which are not considered military 
unique. 
2.  Shelf-Life Extension Program 
The Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) is a DoD program 
which is used by all of the military services. The purpose of 
this program is to avoid replacement costs for materials which 
have "expired" yet still may have a useful shelf-life. The 
method used to receive an extension is straight forward. The 
military service which owns the expired or soon to expire 
material must request a shelf-life extension from the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). The service also incurs the costs 
of this process.  The FDA then takes a representative sample 
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of the item(s) to be tested by the FDA or an FDA-approved 
laboratory. This sample is tested to assure the medication is 
still potent and has useful shelf-life remaining. If after 
this testing, the FDA decides that the medication meets their 
standard for a shelf-life extension, they will grant an 
extension of the original manufacturer's expiration date. The 
extension may be for six months, a year or longer based on the 
FDA's statistical analysis of the potential of the medication 
to maintain the original medicinal properties over that time 
period. 
The Shelf-Life Extension Program is utilized to assure 
medical supply inventories can be used for their entire shelf- 
life. In support of contingency operations, the SLEP is 
relied upon to prolong the useful shelf-life of items held in 
DLA medical inventories. 
SLEP was frequently used prior to the Prime Vendor 
Program for materials maintained in DLA depots as well as for 
Prepositioned War Reserve (PWR) supplies. Many supplies, 
which may be extended prior to their usage or expiration, are 
still maintained throughout the Department of Defense's 
medical inventories. By using these extended supplies through 
their useful shelf-life, Prime Vendors can be utilized to 
obtain other medical supplies which are needed for contingency 
operations. 
Since the initiation of the Prime Vendor Program, there 
has been less reliance on the SLEP. Eventually, the SLEP 
should only be used for the medical inventory which remain in 
DLA depots, specifically military unique items. This phase- 
out would be possible since responsibility for supplying non- 
military unique items is transferred from DLA depots to the 
Prime Vendors. 
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3.  industrial Preparedness Plan 
The Industrial Preparedness Plan (IPP) is a cooperative 
effort between military medical planners and medical 
manufacturers. The plan examines the manufacturing 
capabilities of the medical industry to determine if the 
industrial capacity is able to meet the medical readiness 
requirements. 
In a major regional conflict, medical units from all of 
the military services will be called upon to support the 
operation. In the Prime Vendor example from Operation Uphold 
Democracy, only one major medical unit was activated to 
support that operation, the USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) . While the 
deployment of the COMFORT showed the potential of using a 
Prime Vendor to support a contingency operation, an important 
factor was missing during that operation. That factor is the 
possibility of many medical units deploying for a large 
operation, an MRC. All of these units will have to obtain 
their consumable medical supplies from Prime Vendors. During 
ODS, the Navy deployed Hospital Ships and Fleet Hospitals, the 
Marine Corps utilized medical battalions and other Navy 
medical assets, the Army deployed Field Hospitals and the Air 
Force deployed Air Transportable Hospitals (ATH). All of 
these medical units deployed during the same time frame. In 
the event of an even larger deployment, Prime Vendors could be 
called upon to support a multitude of these units. It is the 
purpose of the IPP, based on the medical requirements of these 
units, to determine if the medical manufacturers are able to 
produce the materials needed for these deploying units. 
By including the Prime Vendors in the planning process, 
both the Navy and the Prime Vendors would be able to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of each another. With 
this type of partnership, both sides would be better able to 
assure successful resolutions to these problems. 
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E.   PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE AMAL SYSTEM 
The AMAL system problems described in Chapter III require 
solutions in order to assure a smooth transition from a 
peacetime military medical environment to providing the 
required medical support for contingency operations. This 
thesis proposes changes to the AMAL configuration based on 
mission, geography and climate as well as reductions in the 
time-lag for AMAL change request forms. 
1. AMAL Mission Configuration 
As stated in Chapter III, the current AMAL system is 
designed, solely, around a combat intensive contingency 
operation which is characterized by a trauma/surgery patient 
load. The primary mission of Navy Medicine is still in 
support of the Fleet during normal and contingency operations 
(particularly combat/conflict scenarios). The AMAL is 
designed around this primary mission, therefore this focus 
should be maintained. However, supporting the primary mission 
does not preclude designing another AMAL or a complementary 
AMAL to support other secondary missions. 
Specifically, complementary AMALs should be configured to 
support humanitarian/disaster relief missions and peacekeeping 
missions. These additional AMALs should be designed around 
the specific patient population which are expected during 
these missions. 
2. AMAL Flexibility for Geography/Climate 
Since U.S. forces operate around the world, AMALs should 
be flexibly designed to allow for differences in geography and 
climate. Disease and Non-Battle Injuries (DNBI) are often 
directly related to the location, terrain or climate where an 
operations takes place. By building flexibility directly into 
the AMAL, the unit "on the ground" has the latitude to order 
the operation-specific items needed to treat or prevent DNBI. 
The primary AMAL should be the combat casualty specific 
list of medical requirements similar to the "one AMAL" concept 
used now for all contingency operations.  In addition to this 
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list there should be secondary or complementary AMALs for 
peacekeeping and relief missions. These secondary AMALs could 
be used in addition to or independent of the primary AMAL, 
based on the type and scope of the operation. The third level 
of the AMAL system should be a list of medications which may 
be required based on the geography or climate of the theater 
of operations. A rather simple example of this type of item is 
insect repellent. In a winter or Arctic operation this item 
would be unnecessary but in a tropical or jungle operation 
insect repellent could be a life-saving necessity. Finally, 
in order to help Prime Vendors plan for contingency 
operations, these lists should be conveyed to the Prime 
Vendors. 
3.  Response Time For AMAL Changes 
As stated in Chapter III, the goal of the ACRs and 
biennial AMAL reviews is that the standard of care practiced 
by deployed units should not be dramatically different than 
that practiced at CONUS MTFs. This goal can only be realized 
when the method of updating AMALs involves a timely, 
responsive review of ACRs. This method of review will allow 
the AMALs to evolve into living documents which can keep pace 
with the ever changing practice of medicine. 
P.   PRIME VENDOR PERSPECTIVE 
While this thesis is written from a Navy perspective, it 
is useful to also view these issues through the eyes of the 
Prime Vendors. The McKesson Drug Company, which is the Prime 
Vendor for the National Capitol, San Diego, and San Francisco 
regions, was contacted for comment. Mr. Phillip Scott, Vice- 
President for Professional and Business Relations at McKesson 
in San Francisco California provided the pharmaceutical 
wholesale industry's perspective during a telephone interview 
with the author. 
While speaking only for his company, Mr. Scott stated 
that he believed his opinions were shared by other Prime 
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Vendors from various geographic regions. Mr. Scott felt that 
his company could adequately support contingency operations 
because of their ability to draw on the company's assets 
across the nation. This claim is supported by tests conducted 
by the Naval Medical Logistics Command. In these tests, a 
contingency scenario is simulated in order to determine the 
supply system which can best support the operation. The 
results of these tests show that the Prime Vendor option 
consistently outperforms the other means of medical supply 
including the DLA depot system, open purchase and direct 
procurement. (Wade, September 1994) 
Mr. Scott also stated, that since most pharmaceutical 
manufacturers operate at a fraction of their potential 
capacity, these manufacturers have the ability to increase 
production to meet some additional demand. Mr. Scott added 
that if the military required a larger quantity of an item 
than McKesson had at it's disposal, the company had agreements 
with other wholesalers as well as manufacturers to ship 
products directly to deploying units with just the paperwork 
being routed through McKesson. 
Finally, Mr. Scott felt that the proposal of informing 
Prime Vendors of operational requirements, such as AMALs, 
would be a useful industry planning tool. This information 
could facilitate the ability of Prime Vendors to support 
contingency operations, especially the surge phase of the 
operations. (Scott, November 1994) 
6.   PREVIEW OF NEXT CHAPTER 
Chapter V contains the conclusions and recommendations of 
this thesis. The primary research question and secondary 
questions proposed in Chapter I are answered in Chapter V. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The central conclusion of this thesis is that the medical 
inventory reductions caused by the Prime Vendor Program have 
not and will not negatively affect Navy Medicine's ability to 
support the surge and sustainment of contingency operations. 
On the contrary, the Prime Vendor Program is a more responsive 
system characterized by faster turn around times, higher fill 
rates, less waste and better customer support than the Defense 
Logistics Agency's depot supply system. The Prime Vendors 
should be able to support the pharmaceutical reguirements for 
contingency operations. 
However, while the Prime Vendor Program may be an 
improvement over the DLA depot system, there is still room for 
improvements in the process (as recommended below). 
Another conclusion of this thesis is that the AMAL 
system, which was so useful during the Cold War, needs to be 
updated to better support the evolving military missions in 
the post-Cold War era. 
B. NAVY MEDICINE'S STRATEGY 
The strategy Navy Medicine should use to assure that Navy 
medical readiness is maintained is to treat the Prime Vendors 
as partners in the successful completion of the medical 
support aspects of contingency operations. By including the 
Prime Vendors in the planning process for these operations, 
the Navy increases the probability that the Prime Vendors will 
understand the operational reguirements. Conseguently, the 
probability that the Prime Vendors will be able to meet these 
requirements would be increased. 
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C.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to improve Navy Medicine's medical support 
mission for contingency operations the following 
recommendations are proposed. 
First, the Navy Medical Department should form a 
partnership with the various Prime Vendors during the planning 
for contingency operations. This proposition serves two 
important purposes. It gives the Prime Vendors the 
requirements information needed to properly budget and plan 
for the pharmaceutical requirements of various contingency 
operations. It also helps Navy medical planners understand 
the Prime Vendors' capabilities. This fact allows the 
planners to determine which items the Prime Vendor should be 
able to provide. By knowing which items the Prime Vendors can 
provide, Navy medical planners can make arrangements to obtain 
the other items which are unavailable through the Prime Vendor 
Program. These items should be maintained as contingency 
safety stock in the DLA depot system. 
Second, the Navy should inform the Prime Vendors of the 
pharmaceutical requirements for contingency operations. 
Specifically, Prime Vendors should be notified of the 
pharmaceutical line-items required as well as the quantities 
required of each of these line-items. This information 
assures that these Prime Vendors will know what supplies are 
required. It also increases the probability that they will be 
able to fulfill those requirements. 
Third, an agreement to rotate contingency supplies 
between the Department of Defense and the Prime Vendors should 
be negotiated. By rotating contingency supplies through 
normal peacetime usage channels, the Prime Vendors would be 
able to minimize waste due to expiration of supplies. This 
would also provide the Department of Defense with assurances 
that the Prime Vendors will have the required inventory to 
support contingency operations, especially the supplies 
required for the surge of an operation. 
42 
Fourth, DoD and Navy planners should utilize other tools 
which are available to them, such as the Industrial 
Preparedness Plan (IPP), Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) 
and D-Day Significant Items List. These tools can help 
planners determine the Prime Vendors' ability to meet 
operational requirements and which items should be procured 
through the Prime Vendors. Also, these tools can delineate 
which items are considered military unique and therefore 
should be maintained as safety stock in the DLA depot system. 
The final recommendation of this thesis is to correct the 
deficiencies in the AMAL system. In the post-Cold War era, 
the defined missions are evolving and being redefined. In 
this type of environment, an AMAL must be flexible enough to 
evolve to match these changing missions. The primary AMAL 
should remain the combat casualty specific list currently in 
use. However, additional AMALs should be established to 
support operations such as humanitarian/disaster relief 
efforts and peacekeeping missions. The final change to the 
AMAL system should be to have a third tier with area-of- 
operation specific items based on geographic location, terrain 
and/or climate. 
By incorporating these recommendations, Navy Medicine 
would be able to continue to improve the medical support 
mission for Fleet contingency operations. 
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